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ABSTRACT
Accruals-based earnings management is becoming a more common practice.
Firms have strong incentives to manage earnings around secondary equity offerings by
insiders (insider offerings) to raise offer prices. However, the literature on earnings
management around insider offerings is limited and provides mixed evidence of earnings
management.

In this study, I investigate the motivations and the extent of earnings

management around insider offerings.
This study examines a sample of 490 secondary equity offerings made by insiders
over the period 1989 to 2005. Inconsistent with the managerial opportunism hypothesis,
I find negative adjusted discretionary total accruals before insider offerings.

While

discretionary accruals drop during the pre-offer year, operating performance improves
during the pre-offer year, keeps improving during the offer year, and deteriorates only
afterwards. These results suggest that downward earnings management before insider
offerings may be manager response to an expectation of a decline in operating
performance after the offerings. In the offer year I find positive adjusted discretionary
total accruals, which may be driven by litigation concerns.
Furthermore, pre-offer discretionary accruals are positively related to the postoffer changes in operating performance but not related to post-offer stock performance.
The findings suggest that earnings management before the offerings is not driven by
managerial opportunism; instead, it reflects superior information

about

future

opportunities, consistent with the earnings smoothing hypothesis. The deterioration in
iii

iv
operating performance immediately after insider offerings can induce securities fraud
lawsuits filed against offering firms. Thus, managers have motives to inflate earnings to
avoid operating performance deterioration, thereby lowering litigation risk. I find that
offering firms do not show a higher incidence of restatements and lawsuits during the
post-offer period. This is opposite of the prediction of the managerial opportunism
hypothesis.
Moreover, I investigate whether firms engage in real earnings management (i.e.,
management of R&D expenses) before insider offerings.

I find that firms slightly

increase R&D expenses before and during the offer year, inconsistent with the hypothesis
that firms manipulate R&D expenses to increase pre-offer earnings. Overall, the study
suggests that discretionary accruals management before insider offerings is to achieve
smoother earnings.

Earnings management during the pre-offer and offer years is

consistent with the litigation avoidance hypothesis.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
Importance of Examining Earnings Management
The market depends on financial statements prepared and reported by management for
stock valuation. Managers can exert their discretion on financial reporting to temporarily
alter the firms' operating performance. As a result, the market faces higher information
risk when firms manage accruals to purposely misrepresent their performance for
favorable stock prices. Such financial reporting decisions impair the efficiency of capital
allocation. Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) report that the average ratio of accruals to
the firms' total assets has been significantly increasing in the past 20 years, suggesting
that accruals-based earnings management is becoming a more common practice.
Accordingly, the motivations behind and the extent of such earnings management
strategies are worthy of further investigation.

Motivations of the Study
Prior studies suggest that firms manipulate earnings before a number of corporate
events (e.g., Rangan (1998) and Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998b) [seasoned equity
issues]; Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998a) and Teoh, Wong, and Rao (1998) [IPOs]; Perry
and William (1994) and Wu (1997) [management buyouts]; Erickson and Wang (1999)
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and Louis (2004) [stock for stock acquisitions]; Rodriguez and Yue (2004) and Gong,
Louis, and Sun (2008) [share repurchases]).

There is also evidence that firms can

manage earnings to reduce litigation risk (e.g., Beneish, Press, and Vargus (2005) and
Weber (2004)) or to smooth earnings (e.g., Tucker and Zarowin (2006)).
Insider offerings provide one setting for examining the motivations behind
earnings management strategies.

This setting presents strong incentives to manage

earnings so that managers can benefit from selling their holdings through the offerings at
the expense of other shareholders or investors. However, the literature on earnings
management around insider offerings is limited and provides mixed evidence of earnings
management. Marquardt and Wiedman (2004) find that firms with insider offerings
show significantly positive discretionary accruals in the offer year while they find no
evidence of earnings management before the offerings.

Similar to the pattern of

discretionary accruals around insider offerings, net income increases during the offer year
and then declines over the post-offer period. The authors suggest that offering firms
inflate earnings in the offer year to obtain higher share prices. However, it seems late to
release the distorted information at the end of the offer year if firms want to manage
earnings to raise stock price in favor of insider sales. At the time of insider offerings,
investors will not be able to observe inflated earnings reported at the end of the year.
Different from Marquardt and Wiedman, Heron and Lie (2004) examine earnings
management around announcements of insider offerings. The authors document positive
discretionary accruals in both the announcement year and the year before, along with
better operating performance relative to matched firms. The managerial opportunism
hypothesis suggests that if the boosted performance results from

intentional

3

misrepresentation, the real corporate performance will reverse during later periods with
the reversal of discretionary accruals. In contrast, Heron and Lie find no decline in
operating performance during the post-announcement period. I argue that earnings
management strategies around announcements of insider offerings may not be related to
managerial opportunism.
Purpose and Objectives of the Study
The main purpose of my study is to investigate the motivations behind and the
extent of earnings management around insider offerings. To examine the motivations
behind earnings management around insider offerings, I test whether offering firms
manipulate earnings to mislead investors, to lower litigation risk, or to smooth earnings.
If firms want to benefit insiders, they may engage in opportunistic earnings management.
That is, managers may temporarily inflate earnings before insider offerings to raise offer
prices. On the other hand, fear of litigation may motivate managers to manage earnings
downward before and upward after the offerings. Moreover, I expect that offering firms
engage in earnings smoothing since earnings smoothing is quite common (e.g., Graham,
Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005)). Making an insider offering is not likely to motivate firms
that are engaged in earnings smoothing to abandon such long-term strategies.

To

examine the extent of earnings management around insider offerings, I study two
earnings management techniques, accruals management and real earnings management
through R & D expenses.

To achieve the purposes of this study, I analyze the following:
1. The pattern of industry- and performance-adjusted discretionary accruals
around insider offerings.

4

2. The pattern of operating performance, such as net income and operating cash
flows around insider offerings.
3. The volatility of earnings around insider offerings by estimating earnings
smoothing ratios.
4. The relation between pre-offer discretionary accruals and post-offer operating
performance.
5. The relation between pre-offer discretionary accruals and post-offer stock
performance.
6. The likelihood of offering firms being sued during the post-offer period.
7. The likelihood of offering firms restating their earnings during the post-offer
period.
8. The pattern of R&D expenses around insider offerings.
Contributions of the Study
This study enriches extant literature by examining the motivations behind and the
extent of earnings management around insider offerings. The main contributions are as
follows: First, this study focuses on a longer and more recent sample period when firms
are threatened with more severe penalties for misleading financial reporting. The 1991
Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations increase the sanctions imposed by
federal judges by more than 20 times (Karpoff and Lott (1993) and Alexander (1999)).
Prior studies on earnings management in the setting focus on a period of lighter sentences

for such corporate violations. Marquardt and Wiedman (2004) examine a sample of
insider offerings during the period of 1984 to 1991. Heron and Lie (2004) examine a
sample of insider offerings announcements during the period of 1980 to 1998.

5
Second, my study leads to a more reliable inference on earnings management
around insider offerings by examining industry- and performance-adjusted discretionary
accruals estimated from cash flow statements. Prior studies on earnings management
around such offerings use balance sheet data to calculate discretionary accruals.
However, Hribar and Collins (2002) show that the estimation of discretionary accruals
using balance sheet items can be biased around corporate events, such as mergers and
acquisitions, discontinued operations, and foreign currency conversions. Kothari, Leone,
and Wasley (2005) also suggest that performance-adjusted

discretionary accrual

measures are better specified in tests for earnings management. Controlling for corporate
performance mitigates the misspecification problem associated with unadjusted
discretionary accrual measures.
Third, I conduct a more detailed examination of earnings management around
insider offerings. When examining the motivations behind earnings management in this
setting, the two prior studies relate the pattern of discretionary accruals to that of net
income. This study includes additional tests on relations between pre-offer discretionary
accruals and post-offer operating performance as well as post-offer stock performance
and tests on the incidence of earnings restatements and lawsuits following insider
offerings. Unlike prior studies, I also examine whether firms manage R&D expenses
around insider offerings.
Last, this study also adds to the research on the information content of insider
trading. Earlier studies show that insider sales precede decreases in stock prices (e.g.,
Jaffe (1974) and Finnerty (1976)). In contrast, Lakonishok and Lee (2001) find that
insider sales have no predictive power for future stock returns. Cline and Fu (2007) also

6
find no association between insider option exercises before announcements of seasoned
equity offerings and post-offer abnormal returns. Consistently, I find that firms have no
abnormal stock performance following insider offerings relative to size- and book-tomarket-matched firms.

This finding suggests that insider sales may be for liquidity

and/or portfolio rebalancing purposes and thus may not contain predictive power for
future stock performance as presented in some studies.
Plan of the Study
The remainder of the study is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews prior
studies of earnings management around insider offerings and discusses the hypotheses of
managerial opportunism, earnings smoothing, and litigation avoidance. Chapter 3
describes the sample of insider offerings and details the methodology for estimating
discretionary total accruals from cash flow statements around the offerings and buy-andhold abnormal returns during the post-offer period. In Chapter 4, I discuss results of
earnings management around insider offerings.
discusses the implication of the results.

Chapter 5 concludes the study and

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS
DEVELOPMENT
A Review of Relevant Studies
There are two studies of earnings management in the context of insider offerings.
Heron and Lie (2004) suggest that firms announcing insider offerings have incentives to
manage earnings upward around the announcements. Likewise, Marquardt and Wiedman
(2004) suggest that firms engage in upward earnings management to benefit insider sales
around the offerings. However, there are mixed results of earnings management in this
setting. Presuming such earnings management is aimed to raise stock prices, the two
studies do not conduct further examination of the motivations behind the strategies.
Nonetheless, their findings

imply that positive discretionary accruals around

announcements and the completion of insider offerings may not be driven by managerial
opportunism.
In an examination of whether opportunistic earnings management dissociates
financial reports and equity valuation, Marquardt and Wiedman (2004) test for evidence
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of opportunistic earnings management around secondary equity offerings during the
period of 1984 to 1991.

The authors find positive discretionary accruals in the year of

all insider offerings as well as higher discretionary accruals in the year of the offerings by
officers and directors. On the other hand, they find that in the pre-offer year firms with
insider offerings have negative discretionary accruals while there is no significant
difference in the accruals of firms with insider offerings and those with other secondary
offerings. In the offer year, firms with insider offerings have higher net income than
firms with other secondary offerings whereas there is no difference in operating cash
flows of the two groups of firms. The results show that upward earnings management by
firms with insider offerings causes a temporary increase in net income in the offer year.
Further, earnings per share decreases in the year after insider offerings. The authors
assert that the finding of positive discretionary accruals in the offer year is consistent with
the managerial opportunism hypothesis.
Marquardt and Wiedman (2004) also find that firms with insider offerings have
higher returns than firms with other offerings in the offer year and the year before.
However, their finding of post-offer stock performance suggests that the evidence of
opportunistic earnings management in the offer year is weak. Though firms with insider
offerings have negative market-adjusted returns during the three years following the
offerings, the post-offer returns are not significantly lower than the results of firms with
other secondary offerings.

1

Marquardt and Wiedman (2004) include both combination and pure secondary equity offerings in the

sample.
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Furthermore, the authors show that for insider offerings, net income loses
predictive power for contemporaneous stock price in the offer year whereas for other
secondary offerings, net income is always a significant determinant of stock valuation.
Their pooled regression analyses provide additional results for the diminishing value
relevance of net income around insider offerings. Specifically, stock price is negatively
related to an interaction term of net income and a year dummy of value one for the offer
year. Instead, they find that nondiscretionary income is incorporated into the valuation of
firms' value during the offer year. Overall, Marquardt and Wiedman's (2004) findings
provide evidence that investors can see through opportunistic earnings manipulation.
As shown in Marquardt and Wiedman (2004), positive discretionary accruals in
the offer year have decreasing relevance to equity valuation. Their finding suggests that
firms with insider offerings may not be able to achieve higher stock prices for insider
sales by managing earnings upward as managed earnings do not fool investors. Further,
firms with insider offerings are more likely to be sued if they engage in opportunistic
earnings management around the offerings. It is questionable that firms are willing to
take high risk to intentionally misrepresent corporate performance for higher stock price
when investors can see through the distorted information.
The other issue pertains to the timing of upward earnings management. It seems
late to manage earnings upward at the end of the offer year to raise stock prices. At the
time of insider offerings, investors are not able to observe positive discretionary accruals
because inflated earnings are first available at the end of the offer year. Therefore,
positive discretionary accruals in the offer year may not be the evidence of opportunistic
earnings management.

10
Different than Marquardt and Wiedman (2004), Heron and Lie (2004) test for
evidence of earnings management around announcements of insider offerings.

The

authors examine insider offerings announced from 1980 to 1998. Using discretionary
accruals estimated from balance sheets, Heron and Lie find that firms with insider
offerings have more positive discretionary accruals in both the pre-announcement year
and the announcement year than firms with other secondary offerings.

For insider

offerings, the upward earnings management coincides with better adjusted operating
performance. Heron and Lie find that operating performance does not decline following
the announcements; instead, firms with insider offerings have better adjusted operating
performance than firms with other secondary offerings during the post-announcement
period.

The results on the post-announcement operating performance suggest the

possibility that managers use financial reporting discretion for reasons other than
misleading investors.
Hypothesis Development
Managers have discretion over financial reporting of operating performance of
their firms. Information asymmetry allows firms to manage earnings and to alter market
perceptions through their portrayal of corporate performance. Prior studies suggest that
2

Heron and Lie (2004) argue that managed earnings influence equity valuation and thus an examination of

earnings management strategies around equity issues helps reveal the motivations behind and the
information associated with the choice of issue types. For instance, the authors find that firms announcing
regular primary shares manage earnings upward before and during the announcement year; the firms
experience declining operating performance following a temporary improvement in performance during the
announcement year. Their interpretation of the results is that firms issue primary shares in response to
inflated stock prices and thus the issuance conveys the overvaluation of the firms' securities.
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firms manage reported earnings to mislead investors, to achieve smoother earnings, and
to reduce litigation risk.
The Managerial Opportunism
Hypothesis
The managerial opportunism hypothesis suggests that managers manipulate
earnings to conceal the firms' real economic value from investors. The hypothesis
implies that investors cannot see through distorted financial statements. Studies show
evidence of opportunistic earnings management before several corporate events, such as
management buyouts (Perry and William (1994) and Wu (1997)), stock for stock
acquisitions (Erickson and Wang (1999) and Louis (2004)), IPOs (Teoh, Welch, and
Wong (1998a) and Teoh, Wong, and Rao (1998)), seasoned equity offerings (Rangan
(1998) and Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998b)), and share repurchases (Rodriguez and Yue
(2004) and Gong, Louis, and Sun (2008)). In contrast, other studies question whether
managers are actually able to mislead investors (Shivakumar (2000), Coles, Hertzel, and
Kalpathy (2006), and Di and Marciukaityte (2008)).
Earnings management before corporate events helps firms to reach desired stock
prices. Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998b) find that net income escalates before seasoned
equity offerings and peak in the offer year while declining afterwards. Discretionary
current accruals display a similar pattern while operating cash flows demonstrate an
opposite pattern. The results suggest that upward earnings management leads to the
improvement in pre-offer operating performance, inducing higher offer prices.

When

grouping firms by pre-offer discretionary current accruals, Teoh, Welch, and Wong find
that firms with the highest level of the accruals experience the worst stock performance
during the post-offer period. Regression analyses show similar results; that is, pre-offer
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discretionary

current

accruals

have

predictive

power

for

post-offer

stock

underperformance. Therefore, the authors conclude that investors cannot see through
inflated earnings before seasoned equity offerings.

Operating performance declines

following the offerings as discretionary current accruals reverse back and investors are
disappointed by the declining post-offer performance. Thus, offering firms experience
worse stock performance during the post-offer period.
Insider offerings involve insiders' personal wealth since the proceeds from these
transactions go directly to selling shareholders. The direct financial involvement in the
issuance may create strong incentives for opportunistic earnings management around
insider offerings.

Prior studies show that firms are willing to engage in earnings

management to benefit their insiders. Bartov and Mohanram (2004) and Wei (2004) find
that managers overstate earnings through increasing discretionary accruals before large
exercises of executive stock options to obtain higher payouts for executives. Moreover,
the Enron case provides an example of firms using earnings management to benefit
managers' sales: Jeffery Skilling, the CEO of Enron, was charged for both misleading
financial reporting and profitable sales of his holdings at temporarily inflated stock prices
(Tenpas (2006)). By examining a sample of fraudulent earnings overstatements, Beneish
(1999) finds that insider sales have predictive power for the occurrence of earnings
management that violates GAAP.
If managers engage in opportunistic earnings manipulation, I expect upward
earnings management before insider offerings, specifically in Year - 1 . Such earnings
management strategy results in a temporary improvement in reported earnings that
induces higher stock prices for insider sales. Subsequently, offering firms experience a
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deterioration in reported earnings and thus poor stock performance during the post-offer
period when managed earnings reverse back.

Managers can overstate earnings by

increasing discretionary accruals or decreasing their expenses, especially R&D expenses.
Furthermore, when earnings management is discovered, firms have to restate earnings
and sometimes they are sued. Thus, if offering firms engage in opportunistic earnings
management they should have a higher incidence of earnings restatements and lawsuits
than matched firms.
Prior studies supporting the managerial opportunism hypothesis suggest that
upward earnings management results in a temporary improvement in operating
performance before insider offerings, inducing good stock performance. However, stock
underperformance is expected after the offerings as earnings that are aggressively
overstated reverse back (Huddart and Louis (2005)). Thus, the managerial opportunism
hypothesis predicts a negative relation between pre-offer discretionary accruals and postoffer stock performance.
The Earnings Smoothing
Hypothesis
Firms often engage in earnings smoothing. A survey by Graham, Harvey, and
Rajgopal (2005) shows that 78% of CFO respondents express willingness to sacrifice
economic value to obtain smoother earnings streams. Some studies suggest that firms do
not abandon their earnings smoothing strategy around corporate events (e.g., Di and
Marciukaityte (2008) [share repurchases]; Di, Goodwin, Marciukaityte (2008) [primary

equity offerings]).

The literature suggests that there are strong incentives to smooth

earnings. Hepworth (1953) points out that earnings smoothing can be driven by tax
concerns and stakeholder relations.

Gordon (1964) argues that managers smooth
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earnings for their own benefits, such as job security and compensation. In addition,
Trueman and Titman (1988) show that earnings stability has a positive effect on
debtholders' assessment of corporate performance and lowers the probability of
bankruptcy.
Geol and Thakor (2003) use information asymmetry to explain the market
reaction to accruals-based earnings smoothing. Specifically, they argue that uninformed
shareholders avert volatile earnings due to expected losses on liquidity trading and such
loss aversion drives firms to smooth earnings. Adverse market reaction occurs when
firms fail to deliver smooth earnings as expected by shareholders. By the same token,
firms have incentives to smooth earnings around insider offerings to avoid negative
market reaction since the offerings involve the trade between informed insiders and
uninformed investors.
The earnings smoothing hypothesis suggests that managers use their discretion in
financial reporting to obtain smoother earnings streams. For example, when a firm
experiences a temporary increase in earnings, it manages earnings downward to achieve
smoother earnings. DeFond and Park (1997) provide evidence that earnings smoothing is
related to current corporate performance and management expectation of future corporate
performance. They find that firms currently performing worse than the industry median
have positive discretionary accruals if they are expected to perform better than the
industry median; in contrast, firms currently performing better than the industry median
have negative discretionary accruals if they are expected to perform worse than the
industry median. Since the strategy requires the ability to foresee temporary changes in
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earnings, smoothed earnings streams reveal management's knowledge of the firm
(Demski(1998)).
Unlike opportunistic earnings management, earnings smoothing is a long-term
strategy that improves communications between managers and investors. Kirschenheiter
and Melamud (2002) argue that smoothed earnings convey long-term corporate
performance and improve the precision of financial figures. Accordingly, they propose
that earnings smoothing is part of an optimal strategy employed by rational managers to
disclose their superior information about future corporate performance.

Furthermore,

Tucker and Zarowin (2006) find that earnings smoothing determines whether current
stock prices reflect future earnings. When an interaction term of earnings smoothing and
future earnings is included in regression analyses, current stock returns are positively
related to the interaction term while the returns become insignificantly related to future
earnings. The findings suggest that earnings smoothing improves the information content
of earnings about future corporate performance.
The earnings smoothing hypothesis predicts downward (upward) earnings
management when a firm experiences a temporary increase (decrease) in earnings. To
achieve smoother earnings, firms can engage in discretionary accruals management or
real earnings management.

If firms engage in earnings smoothing, I expect their

smoothing ratios to be significantly higher than one, and I expect a positive relation
between pre-offer

discretionary accruals and post-offer

changes in operating

performance. When firms smooth earnings they reveal some information about future
earnings and improve earnings informativeness. Accordingly, if firms manage earnings
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to smooth them, I do not expect an increase in the number of restatements or lawsuits
after insider offerings.
If offerings firms manage earnings to smooth earnings, such earnings
management strategies are not aimed to benefit insiders at the expense of investors.
Instead, smoothed earnings convey to investors information about the firms' future
performance.

Thus, the earnings smoothing hypothesis predicts no relation between

earnings management around insider offerings and post-offer stock performance.
The Litigation Avoidance
Hypothesis
Another explanation for earnings management around insider offerings is the
litigation avoidance hypothesis suggesting that firms manage earnings to dissociate
insider sales from poor operating performance afterwards (Beneish, Press, and Vargus
(2005)). The hypothesis implies that earnings management around insider offerings is
driven by litigation concerns. Shareholder litigation is associated with high costs, such as
large lawsuit settlements and negative market reaction to litigation announcements (Ferris
and Pritchard (2001)). According to DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik's (2004) study of
stock offerings made from 1988 to 1997, the lawsuits against the SEO firms misstating
financial statements to mislead investors have an average settlement greater than $10M
with the largest settlement being $87M.

Moreover, insiders involved in fraudulent

trading face criminal charges associated with up to $5M fine and maximum 20-year
imprisonment (Tenpas (2006)).

Material penalties on

fraudulent

insider trading and

opportunistic earnings management impose high costs against these activities and may
give firms the incentives to manage earnings to avoid such penalties.
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Examining whether insider trading provides the incentives for voluntary
disclosure to maximize their profits, Cheng and Lo (2006) find no evidence of a
significant association between insider sales and the frequency of good news or bad news
forecasts by management.

The relation between selling activities and management

forecasts remains insignificant when the authors investigate whether CEO trading exerts
more influence over voluntary disclosure than trading by other insiders. Cheng and Lo's
results suggest that managers do not mislead investors to increase insiders' trading gains
by disclosing good news or avoiding disclosing bad news before the sales. The authors
propose that managers are reluctant to voluntarily disclose distorting information to
investors before insider sales as insider sales are associated with high litigation risk.
Prior research provides evidence that mandatory and voluntary disclosures of
corporate performance are essentially the same. Specifically, Kasznik (1999) finds that
the median of the difference between reported earnings and management forecasts is
0.000.

In the absence of such similarity, contradictory mandatory and voluntary

disclosures would increase the likelihood of investors detecting the fraudulent
information, regardless if mandatorily or voluntarily disclosed. If managers' voluntary
disclosure reflects their concerns of high litigation risk induced by insider sales (Cheng
and Lo (2006)), I expect that the litigation concerns also have an influence on mandatory
financial reporting around insider sales.
Beneish, Press, and Vargus (2005) test the litigation avoidance hypothesis using a
sample of firms associated with technical default from 1983 to 1997. The authors argue
that litigation risk of firms with poor corporate performance stems from the possibility of
investors perceiving to be deceived. They find that firms with abnormal insider sales
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during the year preceding technical default announcements contemporaneously manage
earnings upward while firms with the sales in the default year do not engage in earnings
management. Further, regression analyses show that contemporaneous abnormal insider
sales predict pre-default earnings management but the insider sales in the default year
have no predictive power. The results suggest that default firms employ the earnings
management strategy at the end of the year before technical default to dissociate insider
trades from subsequent poor corporate performance and thus to lower litigation risk. On
the other hand, no evidence of earnings management for firms with abnormal insider
sales in the default year helps these firms to invalidate the accusation of purposefully
misleading investors. The findings of Beneish, Press, and Vargus support the litigation
avoidance hypothesis, suggesting that litigation concerns have a significant impact on
insider trading and financial reporting. Without restricting the sample to firms with
technical defaults, Weber (2004) also find that firms manage earnings upward following
stock sales by CEOs.
Earlier studies show that insider sales precede decreases in stock prices (e.g., Jaffe
(1974) and Finnerty (1976)). If insider sales are followed by a deterioration in operating
performance, it will likely induce investor suspicion about trading based on superior
information.

In addition, the 1991 Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations

increase the sanctions imposed by federal judges by more than 20 times (Karpoff and
Lott (1993) and Alexander (1999)). Facing the threat of shareholder litigation, firms may
take actions to lower the likelihood of costly litigation.
The litigation avoidance hypothesis predicts upward earnings management
following insider offerings to dissociate the sales from the firms' declining performance
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afterwards.

Furthermore, to reduce the probability of litigation firms can manage

earnings downward before insider offerings. If firms are successful in managing earnings
after insider offerings, I expect that the incidence of lawsuits after insider offerings will
not be higher than the incidence of lawsuits for matched firms.
If firms manage earnings due to litigation concerns, earnings management
strategies are aimed to help stabilize stock prices around the offerings rather than to
benefit insiders at the expense of investors.

In this case, the litigation avoidance

hypothesis predicts no relation between earnings management around insider offerings
and post-offer stock performance.
Summary
In this chapter, I review the literature on earnings management and present the
development of hypotheses examined in this study. Insider offerings provide a setting
associated with strong incentives for opportunistic earnings management as insiders'
personal wealth is directly tied to insider offerings. There are few studies examining
earnings management around insider offerings. Though they find that firms engage in
earnings management, they provide mixed evidence of such financial reporting strategies.
In addition, the limited literature does not investigate the motivations behind earnings
management around the events.

It is worthy of research effort to examine the

motivations behind and the extent of earnings management around insider offerings.
There are three possible explanations for earnings management around insider

offerings. First, prior studies posit that firms have incentives to engage in opportunistic
earnings management around corporate events like seasoned equity offerings and share
repurchases. These event studies find evidence that firms misrepresent their operating
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performance to mislead investors to obtain desired stock prices.

The managerial

opportunism hypothesis predicts that firms may temporarily inflate earnings before
insider offerings for higher stock prices.
Second, some studies suggest that firms engage in earnings management to
smooth earnings and to convey future operating performance. The earnings smoothing
hypothesis predicts that firms may manage earnings around insider offerings to
communicate future prospects to the market.
Third, more recent studies suggest that firms manage earnings to lower litigation
risk. The litigation avoidance hypothesis predicts that firms manage earnings downward
before and upward after insider offerings to dissociate the offerings from poor corporate
performance afterwards.
following chapters.

Empirical tests on these hypotheses are discussed in the

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Data
I start with the announcements of U.S. seasoned equity offerings reported in the
Securities Data Corporation (SDC) new issues database from January 1989 to December
2005. Both primary/secondary combination and pure secondary equity offerings are
included to compile a sample of secondary equity offerings by insiders. I require that
firms have CRSP share codes of 10 or 11 and that returns be available in CRSP for the
announcement month. Furthermore, I exclude regulated utilities (SIC codes 4910 4949), depository institutions (SIC codes 6000 - 6099), and holding or other investment
firms (SIC codes 6700 - 6799). The reason for the selection criterion is that firms in
these industries have different accounting and reporting standards and probably have
different motivations for earnings management.

There are 1,507 combination and pure

secondary equity offerings identified from the SDC database.
I use insider trading information from both the SDC and the Thomson Financial
Insider Trading databases to identify secondary equity offerings by insiders. The Thomas
Financial Insider Trading database contains information of all insider trading activities
based on SEC filings. I define insiders as directors, committee members, officers, or
founders of the firm and identify these insiders based on relationship codes in the
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Thomson Financial database. I assume that insiders participate in secondary offerings
when the Thomson Financial database documents insider sales on the offering day.
When

I

cannot

determine

whether

an

equity

offering

involves

insider

selling transactions using the Thomson Financial data, I refer to the SDC database for
data on insider (management) holdings before and after the offering. A secondary equity
offering is identified as an insider offering when there is a decrease in insider holdings
after the offering. Following the procedure, I identify 820 insider offerings during the
sample period.
As prior studies suggest that firms may manage earnings before insider offerings
(Heron and Lie (2004) and Marquardt and Wiedman (2004)), I require adjusted
discretionary total accruals to be available for the pre-offer year. Furthermore, I require
insider offerings involving each firm to be at least three years apart. When there is more
than one insider offering for a firm in a four-year period, I include only the earliest one.
My final sample consists of 490 insider offerings. The event year (Year 0) is the fiscal
year of an insider offering.
Table 3.1 presents descriptive statistics of insider offerings as well as offering
firms. As shown in Panel A, the frequency of insider offerings peaks in 1996, with
13.67% of the offerings in my sample. In Panel B, I report the distribution of insider
offerings based on two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes. Industry
groups with more than 5% of insider offerings in my sample are electronic and other
electric equipment, business services, industrial machinery and equipment, and
instruments and related products.

Table 3.1
Descriptive Statistics of Insider Offering
Panel A: Calendar Distribution
Percent of
Events
1.02

Year

1989

Number of
Events
5

1998

Number of
Events
43

Percent of
Events
8.78

1990

4

0.82

1999

27

5.51

1991

10

2.04

2000

30

6.12

1992

21

4.29

2001

22

4.49

1993

42

8.57

2002

18

3.67

1994

26

5.31

2003

15

3.06

1995

47

9.59

2004

34

6.94

1996

67

13.67

2005

21

4.29

1997

58

11.84

Total

490

100.00

Number of
Events

Percent of
Events

Year

Panel B: Industry Distribution
Industry

JCode

Electronic and other electric equipment

36

53

10.82

Business services

73

52

10.61

Industrial machinery and equipment

35

38

7.76

Instruments and related products

38

36

7.35

Wholesale trade - durable goods

50

24

4.90

Oil and gas extraction

13

22

4.49

Health services

80

18

3.67

Chemicals and allied products

28

15

3.06

Trucking and warehousing

42

13

2.65

Wholesale trade - nondurable goods

51

12

2.45

207
490

42.24

Other
Total

100.00
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Panel C: Select Characteristics of Offering and Matched Firms
ff

Total assets, $M

.

.
8

Industry- & PerformanceMatched Firms
1,385
159

421

120

Percentage change in total assets

36.35

21.83

22.12

12.08

Book leverage, percent

46.11

45.25

42.55

41.73

Cash / total assets, percent

18.39

7.37

19.69

9.36

Tobin's g

2.53

1.97

2.14

1.66

Percentage of insider sales

6.96

7.83

The sample consists of insider sales through secondary equity offerings during 1989 to 2005. Select
characteristics are estimated during or at the end of the pre-offer year. Book leverage is estimated as total
liabilities (item 181) plus the liquidating value of preferred stock (item 10) minus deferred taxes (item 35)
minus convertible debt (item 79), divided by total assets (item 6). Tobin's q is the ratio of total assets
minus the book value of common equity plus the market value of common equity to total assets. I obtain
the market value of equity from CRSP at the beginning of the offer year (Year 0). I obtain accounting
variables from Compustat and the market value of common equity from CRSP. I winsorize accounting
variables at the top 1% and the bottom 1%.

Panel C of Table 3.1 shows select characteristics of insider offerings and offering
firms. I obtain all variables from Compustat. Following Baker and Wurgler (2002), I
estimate book leverage as total liabilities (item 181) plus the liquidating value of
preferred stock (item 10) minus deferred taxes (item 35) minus convertible debt (item
79), divided by total assets (item 6). I compute Tobin's q as the ratio of total assets
minus the book value of common equity (item 60) plus the market value of common
equity (item 199 multiplied by item 54) to total assets. The variables are estimated
during or at the end of the pre-offer year. To avoid problems with extreme values, I
winsorize financial variables at the top 1% and the bottom 1%.3

For comparison

purposes, I also present corresponding characteristics of the industry- and performance-

3

All accounting variables used in the paper are winsorized at the top 1% and the bottom 1%. However,

my results remain the same without winsorizing.
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matched sample. The sample is matched by two-digit SIC codes and return on assets in
the pre-offer year.
As shown in Panel C, offering firms are smaller than matched firms. The median
(mean) total assets of offering firms is $120M ($421M) while that of matched firms is
$159M ($1,385M). Moreover, offering firms grow faster than matched firms.

The

median (mean) percentage change in total assets for offering firms is 21.83% (36.35%)
whereas it is 12.08% (22.12%) for matched firms. Offering firms are slightly more
levered than matched firms, with the median (mean) book leverage of 45.25% (46.11%)
versus 41.73% (42.55%). There is similarity in the level of cash holding between
offering and matched firms. Moreover, offering firms have higher Tobin's g's than
matched firms; the median (mean) Tobin's q is 1.97 (2.53) for offering firms and 1.66
(2.14) for matched firms. The panel also shows that during the offer year the median
(mean) percentage of common shares sold by insiders relative to outstanding shares is
7.83% (6.96%).
Methodology
Discretionary Accruals
Prior studies on earnings management around insider offerings use balance sheet
data to estimate discretionary accruals. Hribar and Collins (2002) show that discretionary
accruals estimated from balance sheet data may lead to spurious findings of earnings
management around corporate events, such as mergers and acquisitions, discontinued

operations, and foreign currency conversions. Therefore, I follow their recommendation
and estimate discretionary total accruals from cash flow statements. Consistent with
Hribar and Collins, total accruals for each firm./ in year t (TAQj) is defined as
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TACjt=EBXIjt-CFOjt,

(l)

where EBXIjt is earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations (item
123) and CFOJtt is operating cash flow from continuing operations (item 308 minus item
124). When observations have total accruals of the absolute value greater than total
assets, they are likely to be subject to recording errors. Therefore, I follow Kothari,
Leone, and Wasley (2005) and exclude these observations from the sample.
I apply the modified Jones (1991) model proposed by Dechow, Sloan, and
Sweeney (1995) to estimate discretionary total accruals.

I exclude firm-years with

combination or pure secondary equity offering from corresponding two-digit SIC code
groups and then estimate the following OLS regression for each two-digit SIC code
group in each year:

TAC„/TAj^

=fi0(l/TAJ^)+fil(&SaleSjJITAjt_,)+P2{GPPEUITA,„)+e„y

{l)

where TAjit.\ is total assets (item 6) at the beginning of year t, ASalesjt is a change in
sales (item 12) during year t, and GPPEjt is the gross property, plant, and equipment
(item 7). To enhance the reliability of the estimates, I perform the OLS regressions only
for the two-digit SIC code groups with at least 10 observations. For each sample firm k
in year t, nondiscretionary total accruals (NDTACk,t) are estimated based on the predicted
coefficients from Equation (2):

NDTACkJ =fi0(l/TAk^)+fi1((^!alesk,

-ATR^/TA^+^GPPE^/TA^),

where ATRk t is a change in trade receivables (item 151).

(3)
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For each sample firm k in year t, discretionary total accruals (DTACki) is
estimated as the difference between total accruals normalized by beginning total assets
and nondiscretionary total accruals:

DTACtJ = TACkJt ITAU_, -NDTACkr

(4)

Although Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995) indicate that the modified version
of the Jones (1991) model is a powerful tool to detect earnings management, they suggest
that the model can be problematic in examining firms with extreme financial
performance. To improve the reliability of the discretionary total accruals measure, I
follow Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005) and estimate industry- and performanceadjusted discretionary total accruals. I match firms by their two-digit SIC codes and
return on assets in the pre-offer year. Offering firms are excluded from the matched
sample during the three years before to three years after the offer year. Furthermore, I
use the same data availability requirements for matched firms that I use for offering
firms.

Adjusted discretionary accruals are estimated as the difference between

discretionary accruals of offering firms and those of matched firms.
Stock Performance after
Insider Offerings
To measure long-run post-offer performance, I estimate buy-and-hold abnormal
returns relative to size-, prior-return-, and book-to-market-matched firms. Buy-and-hold
abnormal returns capture investor experience and suggest a low-trading-cost strategy to
take advantage of detected mispricings.
I follow Barber and Lyon (1997) to estimate buy-and-hold abnormal returns. The
size-, prior-return-, and book-to-market-matched sample is constructed using the
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following procedure. Each month, CRSP firms are separated into ten size portfolios
based on the market value of equity and there is the same number of firms in each size
portfolio. I further establish five prior-return portfolios for each size portfolio. Then, I
assign the corresponding size and prior-return portfolio to each offering firm. Among
firms in each assigned portfolio, I select the firm having the book-to-market ratio closest
to that of the offering firm to the matched sample. The matched sample excludes firms
with combination or pure secondary equity offerings during the three years before to
three years after the offer year. Both the market value of equity and the book-to-market
ratio are obtained at the beginning of the offer year. Book-to-market ratios are estimated
following Fama and French (1993). Prior returns are six-month raw returns before the
offer year.
To estimate buy-and-hold abnormal returns, I first compute the buy-and-hold
return for each firm in the offering and matched samples:

BHRLa>b

=

f l (! + *,,,) - 1 ,

(5)

where BHRi>a,b is the buy-and-hold return for firm / during the period from month a to b
and Ru is the stock return for firm / in month t. The abnormal return is the difference
between the buy-and-hold return of an offering firm and that of its matched firm. If
offering or matched firm does not have returns for the entire buy-and-hold period, I use
abnormal returns for the longest buy-and-hold period that is available (e.g., Hertzel,
Lemmon, Linck, and Rees (2002)).
The stock performance measure can suffer from the delisting bias. As such, I
make the following adjustments to mitigate the delisting bias in measuring long-term
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stock performance. When the CRSP delisting return is available, I add the delisting
return after the return that is last available for the delisted firm. When the CRSP delisting
return is not available and the firm is delisted as a result of poor performance, I follow
Shumway (1997) to use -30% as the last return for NYSE and AMEX firms and follow
Shumway and Warmer (1999) to use -55% for Nasdaq firms.
Summary
This chapter presents the sampling procedure. Using the data reported in the SDC
and the Thomson Financial Insider Trading databases, I identify 490 insider offerings
made over the period 1989 to 2005. Based on the descriptive statistics, sample firms are
small, fast-growing firms with high leverage relative to industry- and performancematched firms. This chapter also discusses the methodology used to examine earnings
management strategies of sample firms. Specifically, I follow the cash flow approach to
estimate discretionary accruals and adjust the discretionary accrual measure for industry
and performance. To measure long-term stock performance following insider offerings, I
estimate buy-and-hold abnormal returns.

CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
Net Income and Operating Cash Flows
The managerial opportunism hypothesis suggests that upward

earnings

management before insider offerings induces a temporary increase in earnings that leads
to higher offer prices before the offerings.

Consistent with the hypothesis, I should

expect overstated reported earnings before insider offerings.

On the other hand, the

litigation avoidance hypothesis predicts that firms manage earnings that are reported
before offerings (Year -1) downward and/or manage earnings that are reported after
offerings (Year 0) upward. Table 4.1 shows the pattern of net income and cash flows
normalized by beginning total assets during the three years before to three years after
insider offerings. I also apply a winsorizing procedure to improve the reliability of the
accounting variables. In Table 4.2, both variables are winsorized at the top 1% and the
bottom 1%, without a significant effect on my results. I use Mests to evaluate the
statistical significance of means and use Wilcoxon sign-rank tests to evaluate that of
medians.
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4.18***
4.48***
330

-3

473***
5.78***
383

-2

8.52***
8.60***
326

9.60***
9.45***
379

0.11
0.35
325

9.25***
10.53***
490

1.46
1.22***
383

1.07
-0.20
320

0.66
1.13*
379

0.10
0.39
475

9.34***
11.02***
475

2.39**
1.63***
475

8.57***
9 83***
475

0

-1.24
-0.52*
442

8.52***
8.90***
443

-6.47***
_1 79***
442

2.43
6.69***
443

1

0.18
-0.43
391

8.96***
9|2***
393

0.77
-1.02***
392

2 94***
4 95***
394

2

-0.19
0.04
333

9 30***
9 72***
337

-1.34*
-0.22*
335

2.20***
4.55***
339
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This table reports net income and cash flow from operations from three years before to three years after the offer year (Year 0) and annual changes in these
variables. Net income and cash flow are scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year. I use Mests for the means and Wilcoxon sign-rank tests for the
medians.
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels (two-tail tests).

Mean, percent
Median, percent
No.

-1

5 97***
7 7g*#*
490

Changes in cash flow from operations; from previous year

Mean, percent
Median, percent
No.

Cash flow from operations

Mean, percent
Median, percent
No.
Panel B: Cash Flow from Operations

Changes in net income from previous year

Mean, percent
Median, percent
No.

Net income

Panel A: Net Income

Fiscal Year

Table 4.1
Unwinsorized Net Income and Cash Flow from Operations

4.43***
4.48***
330

-3

5.39***
5.78***
383

-2

909***
8.60***
326
9.68***
9.45***
379

0.32
0.35
325

9 52***
10.53***
490

1.10
1.22***
383

0.20
-0.20
320

0.76
1.13*
379

-0.04
0.39
475

9 47***
11.02***
475

2 41***
1.63***
475

g 79***
9 83***
475

0

-0.91
-0.52*
442

8.95***
8.90***
443

_4.46***
-1 79***
442

4 57***
6.69***
443

1

-0.12
-0.43
391

0 QJ***
g 22***
393

-1.51**
-1.02***
392

3.24***
4 95***
394

2

-0.15
0.04
333

9 29***
9 72***
337

-1.15
-0.22*
335

2.47***
4.55***
339

3
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This table reports net income and cash flow from operations from three years before to three years after the offer year (Year 0) and annual changes in these
variables. Net income and cash flow are scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year and winsorized at the top 1% and the bottom 1%. I use /-tests for the
means and Wilcoxon sign-rank tests for the medians.
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels (two-tail tests).

Mean, percent
Median, percent
No.

-1

6.16***
7 70***
490

Changes in cash flow from operations from previous year

Mean, percent
Median, percent
No.

Cash flow from operations

Mean, percent
Median, percent
No.
Panel B: Cash Flow from Operations

Changes in net income from previous year

Mean, percent
Median, percent
No.

Net income

Panel A: Net Income

Fiscal Year

Table 4.2
Winsorized Net Income and Cash Flow from Operations
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As shown in Panel A of Table 4.2, net income increases during the pre-offer and
the offer year and deteriorates afterwards. Though net income grows during Year -1, the
increase in net income is only significant when using the Wilcoxon sign-rank test. Panel
B shows that operating cash flows exhibit the same pattern as net income during Year -1
but not afterwards. I find that there is no significant change in operating cash flows
during the offer year and only a marginally significant decrease afterwards.

Taken

together, these results suggest that the increase in net income in Year 0 and the
subsequent decrease may be a result of upward earnings management during Year 0. The
improving net income at the end of the offer year is consistent with the litigation
avoidance hypothesis, suggesting that firms overstate earnings reported after insider
offerings. Moreover, the simultaneous improvement in net income and operating cash
flows in Year -1 does not support the notion that firms opportunistically manage earnings
during the pre-offer year for higher stock prices.
Industry- and Performance-Adjusted
Discretionary Accruals
To test for earnings management around insider offerings, I examine industryand performance-adjusted discretionary total accruals during the three years before to the
three years after the offer year (Table 4.3). To enhance the reliability of the proxy
variable, I winsorize adjusted discretionary total accruals at the top 1% and the bottom
1%. Panel A presents adjusted discretionary total accruals without being winsorized
while Panel B presents the discretionary accruals after being winsorized.

The

winsorizing procedure has no significant impact on my results. The following discussion
of adjusted discretionary accruals is based on the results shown in Panel B of Table 4.3.

-3

-2

-1

-1.63
-1.74*
258

1.26
0.37
323

-1.64*
-1.35**
490

-1.56
-1.74*
258

1.32
0.37
323

-1.49*
-1.35**
490

3.45**
2.51*
250

-2.70**
-1.74*
323

4 90***
2 75***
475

3 47***
I 91***
475

4.98***
2.75***
475

3 39***
1 91***
475

0

-2 93***
-2.88***
391

1.10
1.01
392

-2 91***
-2.88***
391

1.05
1.01
392

1

-1.73*
-0.44*
311

-1.69*
-1.49*
320

-1.59
-0.44*
311

-1.83*
-1.49*
320

2

0.64
0.58
251

-1.42
-1.53**
258

0.87
0.58
251

-1.56
-1.53**
258

3
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This table reports industry- and performance-adjusted discretionary total accruals estimated from cash flow statements during the three years before to three
years after Year 0 for a sample of 490 insider offerings. Adjusted accruals are estimated as a difference between the accruals of issuing firms and those of
matched firms and scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year. I match firms by the two-digit SIC code and return on assets in Year -1. Panel B presents
adjusted discretionary accruals winsorized at the top 1% and the bottom 1%. I use Mests for the means and Wilcoxon sign-rank tests for the medians.
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels (two-tail tests).

Mean, percent
Median, percent
No.

Changes in adjusted discretionary total accruals from previous year

Mean, percent
Median, percent
No.

Adjusted discretionary total accruals

Mean, percent
3.40**
-2.59*
Median, percent
2.51**
-1.74*
No.
250
323
Panel B: Winsorized Adjusted Discretionary Total Accruals

Changes in adjusted discretionary total accruals from previous year

Mean, percent
Median, percent
No.

Adjusted discretionary total accruals

Panel A: Unwinsorized Adjusted Discretionary Total Accruals

Fiscal Year

Table 4.3
Industry- and Performance-Adjusted Discretionary Total Accruals Estimated from Cash Flow Statements

35
I find negative adjusted discretionary total accruals as well as a decline in
adjusted discretionary accruals during Year -1, consistent with the litigation avoidance
hypothesis. The mean (median) adjusted discretionary total accruals are -1.49% (-1.35%)
in Year -1 and decrease by 2.70% (1.74%) during Year -1, significant at the 10% or
higher level.

Furthermore, offering firms have positive adjusted discretionary total

accruals and experience a significant increase in adjusted discretionary accruals in Year
0. The mean (median) adjusted discretionary total accruals are 3.47% (1.91%) in Year 0
and increase by 4.90% (2.75%) from Year -1 to Year 0, significant at the 1% level.
Discretionary accruals decline after Year 0. This evidence of a temporary increase in
discretionary accruals in Year 0 is consistent with the litigation avoidance hypothesis.
When insider offerings occur later in the fiscal year, investors can observe part of
Year 0 earnings before the offerings through quarterly reports. In this case, overstated
earnings in Year 0 can lead to higher offer prices. To ensure that such opportunistic
earnings management is not driving Year 0 discretionary accruals, I construct a
subsample of insider offerings that occur during the second quarter of the fiscal year. For
this subsample, investors can observe Year -1 earnings but cannot observe earnings for
most quarters in Year 0 yet. If offering firms continue having a significant increase in
adjusted discretionary accruals in Year 0, it is unlikely that positive accruals are related to
managerial opportunism. I report industry- and performance-adjusted discretionary total
accruals during the three years before to the three years after the offer year in Table 4.4.
Panel A presents adjusted discretionary total accruals without being winsorized while
Panel B presents the discretionary accruals after being winsorized at the top 1% and the
bottom 1%. The winsorizing procedure does not have a significant impact on my results.
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The pattern of discretionary accruals for the subsample is very similar to that of the full
sample. Thus, the results on discretionary accruals around insider offerings provide no
support for the managerial opportunism hypothesis.

-3
•1

-3.27*
-1.90*
79
-1.90
-2.94*
152

accrual s from previous year

-1.44
-0.50
102

-3.27*
-1.90*
79
-2.04
-2.94*
152

2.32
1.60
77

0.15
-1.52***
102

accrual s from previous year

-1.22
-0.50
102

3.66*
3.93*
147

2.02
3.35**
147

3.95*
3 93***
147

2.24
3.35**
147

-2.76
-4.16
118

0.56
-0.16
118

-3.12*
-4.16**
118

0.44
-0.16
118

-0.94
0.79
89

-2.56
-3.09
93

-0.94
0.79
89

-2.56
-3.09
93

2.91
1.07
66

0.39
-1.47
70

2.91
1.07
66

0.39
-1.47
70

This table reports industry- and performance-adjusted discretionary total accruals estimated from cash flow statements during the three years before to three
years after Year 0 for a subsample of 152 insider offerings made during the second quarter of the fiscal year. Adjusted accruals are estimated as a difference
between the accruals of issuing firms and those of matched firms and scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year. I match firms by the two-digit SIC code
and return on assets in Year -1. Panel B presents adjusted discretionary accruals winsorized at the top 1% and the bottom 1%. I use Mests for the means and
Wilcoxon sign-rank tests for the medians. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels (two-tail tests).

Mean, percent
Median, percent
No.

Mean, percent
Median, percent
No.

Adjusted discretionary total accruals

2.32
0.06
Mean, percent
-1.52
1.60
Median, percent
77
102
No.
Panel B: Winsorized Adjusted Discretionary Total Accruals

Mean, percent
Median, percent
No.

Adjusted discretionary total accruals

Panel A: Unwinsorized Adjusted Discretionary Total Accruals

Fiscal Year

Table 4.4
Industry- and Performance-Adjusted Discretionary Total Accruals Estimated from Cash Flow Statements for the Subsample
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Earnings Smoothing
Earlier tests do not support the hypothesis that firms opportunistically manage
earnings before insider offerings to mislead investors for higher stock prices. I further
examine whether earnings management around insider offerings reflects offering firms'
efforts for smoother earnings streams by estimating earnings smoothing ratios for
offering and industry- and performance-matched firms. The earnings smoothing ratio is
defined as the standard deviation of net income before extraordinary items and
discretionary accruals divided by the standard deviation of net income before
extraordinary items (e.g., Hunt, Moyer, and Shevlin (1997) and Pincus and Rajgopal
(2002)). The net income before extraordinary items and discretionary accruals is the sum
of operating cash flows from continuing operations (Compustat item 308 minus item 124)
and nondiscretionary total accruals (obtained from Equation 3). The net income before
extraordinary items is item 123. Standard deviations of both net income measures are
estimated for offering and matched firms during Year -3 to Year 3. I require that both net
income measures have no missing values during the 7-year period examined in this study.
For a comparison between offering and matched firms, I require smoothing ratios to be
available for both offering and matched firms. Under the restrictions imposed here, there
are 127 pairs of offering and matched firms.
If offering firms engage in earnings management to smooth earnings, managed
earnings should have a lower variability than unmanaged earnings.

Accordingly,

standard deviations of net income before extraordinary items and discretionary accruals
should be higher than standard deviations of net income before extraordinary items,
resulting in smoothing ratios higher than 1. Table 4.5 presents smoothing ratios of
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offerings and industry- and performance-matched firms. I use Mests and Wilcoxon signrank tests when examining whether smoothing ratios are higher than 1 and whether
smoothing ratios of offering firms are different than those of matched firms. I find that
the mean (median) smoothing ratio of offering firms is 1.90 (1.34), significantly higher
than 1 at the 1% level. Moreover, I find no significant difference in smoothing ratios of
offering and matched firms. The results suggest that, similar to other firms, offering
firms use discretionary accruals to smooth earnings.
Table 4.5
Earnings Smoothing around Insider Offerings
Offering
„.
°
Firms

Matched
„.
Firms

_.rr
Difference

Earnings smoothing ratio, mean

I 9Q***

1.78***

0.12

Earnings smoothing ratio, median

1.34***

1.43***

-0.13

^-statistic for smoothing ratio minus 1

5.46

7.40

0.65

p-vahxe for smoothing ratio minus 1

0.000

0.000

0.72

127

127

127

No.

The earnings smoothing ratio is the standard deviation of earnings before extraordinary items and
discretionary accruals divided by the standard deviation of earnings before extraordinary items. The net
income before extraordinary items and discretionary accruals is the sum of operating cash flows from
continuing operations (Compustat item 308 minus item 124) and nondiscretionary total accruals (obtained
from Equation 3). The net income before extraordinary items is item 123. I estimate these standard
deviations for each issuing and industry- and performance-matched firm during Years -3 to 3. To
determine whether smoothing ratios are significantly different than 1 and whether smoothing ratios of
issuing firms are different than those of matched firms, I report /-statistics as well as p-values from
Wilcoxon sign-rank tests.
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels (two-tail tests).

A potential explanation for downward earnings management before insider
offerings is that firms may manage earning downward to reflect insiders' knowledge
about future performance. If offering firms smooth earnings, I expect that discretionary
accruals in Year -1 contain information about the firms' future cash flows. Specifically,
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the earnings smoothing hypothesis suggests that offering firms increase (decrease)
discretionary accruals when expecting an improvement (deterioration) in operating
performance. I further test the earnings smoothing hypothesis by examining the relation
between pre-offer discretionary accruals and post-offer changes in operating cash flows.
I report changes in operating cash flows from Year -1 to Year 3 by the quartiles of
discretionary total accrual (Year -1) in Table 4.6 where changes in cash flows are not
winsorized and in Table 4.7 where the cash flow variables are winsorized at the top 1%
and the bottom 1%. In these tables, Panel A presents post-offer changes in cash flows by
the quartiles of adjusted discretionary total accruals in Year -1 and Panel B presents postoffer changes in cash flows by the quartiles of changes in adjusted discretionary total
accruals in Year -1.
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Table 4.6
Unwinsorized Operating Performance by the Quartiles of Pre-Offer Discretionary
Accruals
Changes in Operating Cash Flows From Year -1 to Year 3
Mean,
_ c , ,. ..
Median,
.. ,
XT
^-Statistic
p-Value
No.
0/
n/
%

%

Panel A: Quartiles of Adjusted Discretionary Total Accruals in Year -1
Lowest quartile

-3.15

-3.50***

0.001

79

2nd quartile

-5.37***
-4.49***

-3.32

-5.10***

0.000

92

3rd quartile

-1.31

-1.05

0.49

0.607

86

Highest quartile

3.98***

4.35

6.84***

0.000

80

Difference (highest -- lowest)

14.35***

5.36

10.34***

O.0001

Panel B: Quartiles of Changes in Adjusted Discretionary Total Accruals in Year -1
Lowest quartile

-2.64

-1.03

-2.47

0.269

51

2nd quartile

-2.32

-1.42

-1.45

0.263

53

3rd quartile

-1.37

-0.99

-0.87

0.328

58

Highest quartile

0.25

0.10

-1.13

0.891

57

Difference (highest -- lowest)

2.89

0.81

1.34

0.561

This table reports the post-offer operating performance by the quartiles of discretionary accruals. Panel A
presents the cash flow from operations from Year -1 to Year 3 by the quartiles of adjusted discretionary
total accruals in Year -1. Panel B presents the changes in cash flow from operations from Year -1 to Year 3
by the quartiles of changes in adjusted discretionary total accruals in Year -1. The cash flow from
operations and adjusted discretionary accruals are scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year. I use ttests for the means and the differences in the means between the highest and lowest accrual quartiles. I use
Wilcoxon sign-rank tests for the medians and for the differences in the medians between the highest and
lowest accrual quartiles.
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels (two-tail tests).

42

Table 4.7
Winsorized Operating Performance by the Quartiles of Pre-Offer Discretionary Accruals
Changes in. Operating Cash Flows From Year -1 to Year 3
Mean,
%

^-Statistic

Median,
%

p-Vahxe

No.

Panel A: Quartiles of Adjusted Discretionary Total Accruals in Year -1
Lowest quartile

-5.04***

-3.18

-3.50***

0.001

79

2nd quartile

-4.58***

-3.50

-5.10***

0.000

92

3rd quartile

-1.29

-1.04

0.49

0.607

86

Highest quartile

8.63***

4.46

6.84***

0.000

80

Difference (highest -- lowest)

13.67***

5.47

10.34***

O.0001

Panel B: Quartiles of Changes in Adjusted Discretionary Total Accruals in Year •-1
Lowest quartile

-2.30

-1.01

-2.47

0.273

51

2nd quartile

-2.32

-1.42

-1.45

0.263

53

3rd quartile

-1.37

-0.99

-0.87

0.328

58

Highest quartile

0.22

0.09

-1.13

0.891

57

Difference (highest -- lowest)

2.52

0.76

1.34

0.563

This table reports the winsorized post-offer operating performance by the quartiles of discretionary accruals.
Panel A presents the cash flow from operations from Year -1 to Year 3 by the quartiles of adjusted
discretionary total accruals in Year -1. Panel B presents the changes in cash flow from operations from
Year -1 to Year 3 by the quartiles of changes in adjusted discretionary total accruals in Year -1. The cash
flow from operations and adjusted discretionary accruals are scaled by total assets at the beginning of the
year. The changes in cash flow from operations are winsorized at the top 1% and the bottom 1%. I use ttests for the means and the differences in the means between the highest and lowest accrual quartiles. I use
Wilcoxon sign-rank tests for the medians and for the differences in the medians between the highest and
lowest accrual quartiles.
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels (two-tail tests).

Though the winsorizing procedure does not have a significant impact on my
results, I focus my discussion on the results as shown in Table 4.7 due to the higher
reliability.

Firms in the highest discretionary accrual quartile experience significant

increases in operating cash flows from Year -1 to Year 3 while firms in the lowest
discretionary accrual quartile experience significant decreases in operating cash flows.
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The difference in the mean (median) post-offer change in operating performance between
firms in the highest and the lowest discretionary accrual quartiles is 13.67% (10.34%),
significant at the 1% level.

The results are consistent with earnings smoothing.

Similarly, I also find that firms in the highest quartile of changes in adjusted discretionary
accruals show improved operating cash flows during the post-offer period while firms in
the lowest quartile show deteriorating operating cash flows; the changes in operating cash
flows for all quartiles are not statistically significant. However, there is no significant
difference in post-offer changes in operating cash flows between firms in the two extreme
quartiles of changes in adjusted discretionary accruals.
As univariate analyses show some evidence of earnings smoothing, I employ
regression analyses to reexamine the relation between changes in post-offer operating
performance

and

pre-offer

characteristics (Table 4.8).

discretionary

accruals

while

controlling

for

firm

Panel A reports the results of regressions using the

accounting variables without being winsorized while Panel B reports the results of
regressions using winsorized variables. The winsorizing procedure is applied to the top
1% and the bottom 1% of the accounting variables and does not have a significant impact
on my results. I include the logarithm of the market value of equity to control for firm
size, Tobin's q to control for growth opportunities, and book leverage to control for
financial distress.
Consistent with the univariate test results, I find that discretionary accruals in
Year -1 show statistically significant predictive power on changes in operating cash flows
from Year -1 to Year 3. Specifically, post-offer operating cash flows increase with preoffer discretionary accruals. Furthermore, regression analyses show a significant relation
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between the changes in discretionary accruals before the offers and the changes in
operating cash flows after the offers. My findings provide evidence that firms reduce
discretionary accruals before insider offerings to smooth earnings rather than to deceive
investors about the firms' true performance.
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Table 4.8
Regression Analyses of the Relation between Post-Offer Changes in Cash Flow from
Operations and Pre-Offer Discretionary Accruals
Dependent Variable:
Changes in Cash Flow from
Operations
Panel A: Regressions with Unwinsorized Variables
Intercept
Adjusted discretionary total accruals

-0.0216
(-0.58)
0.2932***
(7.22)

Changes in adjusted discretionary total accruals
Logarithm of market value of equity
Tobin's q
Book leverage
Adjusted R2
No.

-0.0607
(-1.18)

0.0036
(0.59)
-0.0015
(-0.34)
0.0000
(0.05)

0.1019**
(2.52)
0.0062
(0.79)
-0.0074
(-1.16)
0.0007
(1.11)

0.130
325

0.043
210

-0.0089
(-0.24)
0.3204***
(7.49)

-0.0511
(-1.03)

Panel B: Regressions with Winsorized Variables
Intercept
Adjusted discretionary total accruals
Changes in adjusted discretionary total accruals
Logarithm of market value of equity
Tobin's q
Book leverage
Adjusted R2
No.

0.0055
(0.93)
-0.0058
(-1.22)
-0.0002
(-0.51)

0.0830*
(1.86)
0.0058
(0.78)
-0.0089
(-1.40)
0.0006
(1.03)

0.140
325

0.030
210

This table reports regression analyses of the relation between post-offer changes in cash flow from
operations and pre-offer adjusted discretionary accruals as well as changes in pre-offer adjusted
discretionary accruals. The dependent variable is the change in cash flow from operations from Year -1 to
Year 3. The cash flow from operations and adjusted discretionary accruals are scaled by total assets at the
beginning of the year. All independent variables are estimated during or at the end of Year -1. In Panel B,
all variables are winsorized at the top 1% and the bottom 1% of the data. T-statistics are in parentheses.
***,**, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels (two-tail tests).
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Stock Performance after Insider Offerings
Table 4.9 presents buy-and-hold abnormal returns during one year and three years
after insider offerings.

Similar to Clarke, Dunbar, and Kahle (2004), I find some

evidence of stock underperformance following insider offerings. On average, offering
firms have returns that are 25.76% lower than size-, prior-returns-, and book-to-marketmatched firms during the three years after insider offerings and the difference in returns
is significant at the 5% level. However, the abnormal stock performance after insider
offerings is sensitive to the choice of matching portfolios. When estimating the postoffer abnormal stock performance relative to the portfolio matched by size and book to
market, I find no evidence that offering firms perform worse than matched firms during
the three years following insider offerings.
Table 4.9
Abnormal Stock Performance after Insider Offerings
Matching Portfolios:
Size and
Size, Prior Return,
Book to Market
and Book to Market
Panel A: Abnormal Returns in One Year after Insider Offerings
Mean, percent
t- Statistic
No.

5.18
1.17
459

4.36
0.91
434

Panel B: Abnormal Returns in Three Years after Insider Offerings
Mean, percent
^-Statistic
No.

-5.16
-0.75
459

-25.76**
-2.33
434

This table reports abnormal returns during the one year and the three years following the offer year (Year
0). Panel A presents the one-year post-offer abnormal returns and Panel B presents the three-year postoffer abnormal returns. Abnormal returns are buy-and-hold size-, prior-return-, and book-to-marketadjusted returns during the post-offer period.
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels (two-tail tests).
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If earnings management before insider offerings is driven by managerial
opportunism, I expect a negative relation between discretionary accruals before the
offerings and stock performance afterwards. Table 4.10 examines abnormal returns after
insider offerings by the quartiles of adjusted discretionary total accruals (Panel A) as well
as by the quartiles of changes in adjusted discretionary total accruals (Panel B) in Year 1. Abnormal returns are buy-and-hold size-, prior-return-, and book-to-market-adjusted
returns during the three years after insider offerings. Inconsistent with the managerial
opportunism hypothesis, I find no evidence of a negative relation between discretionary
accruals in Year -1 and stock performance following the offerings.
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Table 4.10
Stock Performance by the Quartiles of Pre-Offer Discretionary Accruals
Abnormal Returns after Insider Offerings
Mean,
Median,
^-Statistic
p-VahiQ
No.
%

%

Panel A: Quartiles of Adjusted Discretionary Total Accruals in Year -1
Lowest quartile

-31.35*

-1.86

-30.51*

0.054

104

2nd quartile

-8.40

-0.49

2.54

0.942

111

3rd quartile

-22.19

-1.50

-11.41

0.265

108

Highest quartile

-41.35

-1.23

-16.88**

0.030

111

Difference (highest - lowest)

-10.01

-0.27

13.63

0.921

Panel B: Quartiles of Changes in Adjusted Discretionary Total Accruals in Year -1
Lowest quartile

-17.61

-0.95

-7.83

0.402

75

2nd quartile

-2.92

-0.18

-2.31

0.775

73

3rd quartile

-78.02

-1.62

-11.28

0.154

72

Highest quartile

16.11

0.63

-13.60

0.616

70

Difference (highest - lowest)

3 3.72

1.07

-5.77

0.797

This table reports the post-offer stock performance by the quartiles of pre-offer discretionary accruals.
Panel A presents post-offer abnormal returns by the quartiles of adjusted discretionary total accruals in Year
-1. Panel B presents post-offer abnormal returns by the quartiles of changes in adjusted discretionary total
accruals in Year -1. Abnormal returns are buy-and-hold size-, prior-return-, and book-to-market-adjusted
returns during the three years after insider offerings. Adjusted discretionary accruals are scaled by total
assets at the beginning of the year. I use Mests for the mean values while I use Wilcoxon sign-rank tests for
the median values.
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels (two-tail tests).

In addition, I use regression analyses to reexamine the relation between
discretionary accruals and stock performance while controlling for firm characteristics
(Table 4.11). Panel A reports the results of regressions using the accounting variables
without being winsorized while Panel B reports the results of regressions using
winsorized variables. The winsorizing procedure is applied to the top 1% and the bottom
1% of the accounting variables and does not have a significant impact on my results.
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Similar to the univariate test results, regression analyses show no relation between postoffer stock performance and pre-offer discretionary accruals. Overall, these findings
suggest that firms do not mislead investors by managing the earnings before insider
offerings.
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Table 4.11
Regression Analyses of the Relation between Post-Offer Stock Performance and PreOffer Discretionary Accruals
Dependent Variable:
Abnormal Returns
after Insider Offerings
Panel A: Regressions on Unwinsorized Independent Variables
Intercept
Adjusted discretionary total accruals

0.9737*
(1.79)
-0.0121
(-0.02)

Changes in adjusted discretionary total accruals
Logarithm of market value of equity
Tobin's q
Book leverage
Adjusted R2
No.

1.4187*
(1.85)

-0.1163
(-1.31)
-0.0558
(-0.84)
-0.0109*
(-1.75)

0.2764
(0.43)
-0.0770
(-0.66)
-0.1378
(-1.36)
-0.0192**
(-2.15)

0.004
419

0.007
278

Panel B: Regressions with Winsorized Independent Variables
Intercept
Adjusted discretionary total accruals

1.0408*
(1.89)
0.1398
(0.21)

Changes in adjusted discretionary total accruals
Logarithm of market value of equity
Tobin's q
Book leverage
Adjusted R2
No.

1.4360*
(1.86)

-0.1046
(-1.18)
-0.0870
(-1.15)
-0.0120*
(-1.89)

0.2320
(0.33)
-0.0746
(-0.64)
-0.1471
(-1.41)
-0.0194**
(-2.17)

0.006
419

0.008
278

The table reports regression analyses of the relation between post-offer abnormal stock returns and adjusted
discretionary accruals as well as changes in adjusted discretionary accruals in Year -1. The dependent
variable is three-year post-offer buy-and-hold size-, prior-return-, and book-to-market-adjusted returns.
Adjusted discretionary accruals are scaled by total assets at the beginning of Year -1. All independent
variables are estimated during or at the end of Year -1. In Panel B, the winsorized procedure is applied at
the top 1% and the bottom 1% of all accounting variables. T-statistics are in parentheses.
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels (two-tail tests).
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Earlier tests suggest that firms increase discretionary accruals in the year of
insider offerings to lower litigation risk. In contrast, it may be argued that the increase in
discretionary accruals is related to managers' opportunistic intention of misleading the
market into raising its evaluation of the firms' securities.

To further examine this

possibility, I test for a relation between post-offer stock performance and discretionary
accruals in Year 0 as described before. First, I examine post-offer abnormal returns by
the quartiles of adjusted discretionary total accruals as well as by the quartiles of changes
in adjusted discretionary total accruals in Year 0 (Table 4.12). Then I apply regression
analyses to reexamine the relation between the two measures while controlling for firm
characteristics (Table 4.13). Both tests show similar results, suggesting that offering
firms' discretionary accruals in Year 0 do not provide an explanation for stock
performance afterwards. The findings are inconsistent with the managerial opportunism
hypothesis that predicts post-offer stock underperformance of firms with high accruals.
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Table 4.12
Stock Performance by the Quartiles of Discretionary Accruals in Year 0
Abnormal Returns after Insider Offerings
Mean,
0/

A)

^ _. ,. ,.
^-Statistic

Median,
0/

/o

., ,
p-Value

XT
No.

Panel A: Quartiles of Adjusted Discretionary Total Accruals in Year 0
Lowest quartile

-34.70

-0.98

-2.73

0.641

98

2nd quartile

-25.29

-1.58

-17.18*

0.073

107

3rd quartile

-30.89*

-1.79

-13.66

0.113

113

Highest quartile

-21.53

-1.13

-13.25*

0.054

107

Difference (highest - lowest)

13.17

0.33

-10.52

0.343

Panel B: Quartiles of Changes in Adjusted Discretionary Total Accruals in Year 0
Lowest quartile

-31.62

-0.97

-2.00

0.683

105

2nd quartile

-24.83

-1.53

-17.88**

0.049

100

3rd quartile

-16.57

-0.80

-11.79

0.118

111

-39.07**

-2.37

-13.49*

0.063

109

-7.45

-0.20

-11.49

0.304

Highest quartile
Difference (highest - lowest)

This table reports the post-offer stock performance by the quartiles of discretionary accruals in Year 0.
Panel A presents post-offer abnormal returns by the quartiles of adjusted discretionary total accruals in Year
0. Panel B presents post-offer abnormal returns by the quartiles of changes in adjusted discretionary total
accruals in Year 0. Abnormal returns are buy-and-hold size-, prior-return-, and book-to-market-adjusted
returns during the three years after insider offerings. Adjusted discretionary accruals are scaled by total
assets at the beginning of the year. I use ^-tests for the mean values while I use Wilcoxon sign-rank tests for
the median values.
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels (two-tail tests).

53
Table 4.13
Regression Analyses of the Relation between Post-Offer Stock Performance and
Discretionary Accruals in Year 0
Dependent Variable:
Abnormal Returns
after Insider Offerings
Panel A: Regressions on Unwinsorized Independent Variables
Intercept
Adjusted discretionary total accruals

0.9110
(1.63)
0.0392
(0.06)

Changes in adjusted discretionary total accruals
Logarithm of market value of equity
Tobin's q
Book leverage
Adjusted R2
No.

0.9159*
(1.66)

-0.1071
(-1.20)
-0.0582
(-0.87)
-0.0110*
(-1.74)

0.0113
(0.02)
-0.1075
(-1.21)
-0.0584
(-0.87)
-0.0111*
(-1.75)

0.004
412

0.004
412

Panel B: Regressions with Winsorized Independent Variables
Intercept
Adjusted discretionary total accruals

0.9913*
(1.75)
-0.0133
(-0.02)

Changes in adjusted discretionary total accruals
Logarithm of market value of equity
Tobin's q
Book leverage
Adjusted R2
No.

0.9825*
(1.76)

-0.0970
(-1.08)
-0.0902
(-1.19)
-0.0122*
(-1.89)

0.0390
(0.08)
-0.0966
(-1.08)
-0.0896
(-1.18)
-0.0121*
(-1.89)

0.005
412

0.005
412

The table reports regression analyses of the relation between post-offer abnormal stock returns and adjusted
discretionary accruals as well as changes in adjusted discretionary accruals in Year 0. The dependent
variable is three-year post-issue buy-and-hold size-, prior-return-, and book-to-market-adjusted returns.
Adjusted discretionary accruals are scaled by total assets at the beginning of Year 0. Other independent
variables are estimated during or at the end of Year -1. In Panel B, the winsorized procedure is applied at
the top 1% and the bottom 1% of all accounting variables, ^-statistics are in parentheses.
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels (two-tail tests).
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Securities Fraud Lawsuits
Lu (2004) finds that there is a positive relation between accruals-based earnings
management and litigation risk as well as lawsuit settlements. Similarly, DuCharme,
Malatesta, and Sefcik (2004) show that opportunistic earnings management around equity
offerings

raises the possibility of shareholder lawsuits against issuing firms.

Accordingly, I expect that if firms opportunistically manage earnings before insider
offerings, offering firms should be sued afterwards more often than other firms.
I obtain a list of federal class action securities fraud lawsuits that were filed after
1995 from the Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse.4 From the database, I
identify the firms that were sued and the dates when lawsuits were filed. To match
lawsuits involving offering and industry- and performance-matched firms, I obtain the
CRSP Permanent Number for each sued firm. The final lawsuit sample consists of filings
against 1,643 firms during the period of January 1996 to December 2005.
I examine securities fraud lawsuits filed against offering firms and matched firms
during the three years after the offer year (Table 4.14). I find that 8.16% of offering
firms are sued during the post-offer period. There is no significant difference in the
frequency of lawsuits between offering and matched firms. My findings provide no
evidence that offering firms are more likely to be sued after insider offerings than
matched firms. The results suggest that investors do not perceive discretionary accruals
around the offerings, especially positive discretionary accruals in Year 0, to be
misleading. Rather, overstated earnings at the end of the offer year seem to help offering
firms lower litigation risk, as suggested by the litigation avoidance hypothesis.

4

http://secxirities.stanford.edu/index.html
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Table 4.14
Securities Fraud Lawsuits after Insider Offerings
Percentage of Firms Named in Lawsuits
Offering

firms

Industry- and performance-matched

8.16%
firms

7.35%

Difference

0.81%

z-statistic

0.48

This table reports the percentages of offering and matched firms that get sued for committing securities
fraud. I match firms by the two-digit SIC code and return on assets in Year -1. The lawsuits examined here
are filed during the three years after the offer year. The lawsuit sample includes the lawsuits filed from
1996 to 2005. I use the z-test for the difference in the percentages of lawsuits between repurchasing and
matched firms.

Earnings Restatements
Agrawal and Chadha (2005) suggest that the examination of earnings restatements
has certain advantages in detecting earnings manipulation over examination of
discretionary accruals. When managers agree to restate earnings, they admit that earlier
reported earnings are incorrect. On the other hand, measures of discretionary accruals are
academic concepts that only proxy for earnings management and suffer from
measurement error problems. The finding of positive or negative discretionary accruals
does not necessarily indicate that reported earnings are incorrect. Instead, managers may
increase or decrease discretionary accruals to reflect their expectations of business
conditions.5
Examining earnings restatements gives a more clear indication of underlying
managerial intentions behind aggressive accounting practices. Richardson, Tuna, and
Wu (2003) find that restating firms have higher total accruals than non-restating firms.
Their logistic regression results suggest that firms with higher accruals are more likely to
5

Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998a) present a description of earnings management methods.

56
restate earnings.

Thus, if firms opportunistically manage earnings before insider

offerings, offering firms should be more likely to restate their earnings after offerings
than other firms.
To compile the restatement sample, I start with the Financial Statement
Restatement Database created by the General Accounting Office (GAO). The database
includes restatements made from January 1997 to June 2005. To extend the database to
include restatements made from January 1989 to December 1996, I follow the procedure
used to construct the Financial Statement Restatement Database as described in GAO
(2002). I conduct a Lexis-Nexis search of the keyword "restate" and its variations.
Further, I exclude restatements associated with changes in accounting rules and methods
because such restatements are not associated with earnings misstatements. Based on the
Lexis-Nexis articles, I identify downward earnings restatements.

Since downward

earnings restatements suggest upward earnings manipulation before the restatements,
they are especially appropriate for my study.
earnings restatements.

My initial sample consists of 1,310

For 1,121 of them, I can identify whether the restatement

increases, decreases, or has no effect on previously reported earnings. There are 972
(86.71%) restatements that have a negative impact on earnings.
In Table 4.15 I examine earnings restatements during the three years following
insider offerings and compare the frequencies of earnings restatements between offering
and industry- and performance-matched firms. I find that only 1.63% of offering firms
have downward earnings restatements. The percentage of restatements made by offering
firms is not significantly different than that of restatements made by industry- and
performance-matched firms. As offering firms are not more likely to restate earnings
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than do matched firms, the results are inconsistent with the proposition that firms
opportunistically manipulate earnings upward before insider offerings.
Table 4.15
Earnings Restatements after Insider Offerings
Percentage of Firms Restating Earnings
Offering

firms

Industry- and performance-matched

1.63%
firms

1.43%

Difference

0.20%

z-statistic

0.26

This table reports the percentages of offering and matched firms experiencing earnings restatements during
the three years after the offer year. I match firms by the two-digit SIC code and return on assets in Year -1.
The earnings restatement sample includes restatements announced during January 1989 to June 2005. I
obtain the restatements made from 1989 to 1996 from the General Accounting Office restatement database.
When extending the sample to earlier and later years, I identify whether a restatement is earningsincreasing or earnings-decreasing from Lexis-Nexis articles. This study focuses on downward earnings
restatements. I use the z-test for the difference in the percentages of earnings restatements between
repurchasing and matched firms.

Real Earnings Management
The requirement to immediately and fully recognize R&D expenses gives firms
an alternative way to manipulate earnings around corporate events. In addition, Healy
and Wahlen (1999) suggest that discretionary accruals may not capture the effect of real
earnings management using R&D expenses. Prior studies show that firms alter R&D
investments to meet earnings expectations (e.g., Jacobs (1991) and Dechow and Sloan
(1991)). In the survey by Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005), top executives show
preference for managing real expenses like R&D in reaching earnings goals. If managers
intend to mislead investors before insider offerings, they can increase reported earnings
by temporarily decreasing R&D expenses. Such real earnings management strategies
lead to poor business decisions that are costly to firms in the long run. Gunny (2005)
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shows that earnings management through reducing R&D expenses induces lower
operating performance in the subsequent periods.
In Table 4.16 I examine the pattern of R&D expenses normalized by beginning
total assets during the three years before to three years after the offer year. Panel A
presents R&D expenses without being winsorized while Panel B presents the expenses
after being winsorized. The variable is winsorized at the top 1% and the bottom 1% of
the data, without a significant impact on my results.

I find no evidence of firms

decreasing R&D expenses before the offering. The median changes in R&D expenses in
these two years are positive and statistically significant whereas the mean changes in the
expenses are not significantly positive. The results do not support the hypothesis that
firms temporarily decrease R&D expenses before insider offerings to overstate earnings.
Among all firm-years, approximately 47% of them have R&D expenses taking zero
values. In Table 4.17 I reexamine the pattern of R&D expenses around insider offerings
by excluding those observations with R&D expenses equal to zero. Panel A presents
R&D expenses without being winsorized while Panel B presents the expenses after being
winsorized at the top 1% and the bottom 1% of the data. Inconsistent with managerial
opportunism, I find some evidence that R&D expenses increase in Year -1 and Year 0.
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This table reports R&D expenses of the sample of insider offerings from three years before to three years after the offer year (Year 0) and annual changes in
these expenses. R&D expenses are scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year and winsorized at the top 1% and the bottom 1%. I use Mests for the
means and Wilcoxon sign-rank tests for the medians.
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels (two-tail tests).

Mean, percent
Median, percent
No.

Changes in R&D expenses from previous year

Mean, percent
Median, percent
No.

R&D expenses

Mean, percent
Median, percent
No.
Panel B: Winsorized R&D Expenses

Changes in R&D expenses from previous year

Mean, percent
Median, percent
No.

R&D expenses

Panel A: Unwinsorized R&D Expenses

Fiscal Year

Table 4.16
R&D Expenses
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This table reports R&D expenses of the sample of insider offerings from three years before to three years after the offer year (Year 0) and annual changes in
these expenses. R&D expenses are scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year and winsorized at the top 1% and the bottom 1%. I use Wests for the
means and Wilcoxon sign-rank tests for the medians.
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels (two-tail tests).

Mean, percent
Median, percent
No.

Changes in R&D expenses from previous year

Mean, percent
Median, percent
No.

R&D expenses

Mean, percent
Median, percent
No.
Panel B: Winsorized R&D Expenses

Changes in R&D expenses from previous year

Mean, percent
Median, percent
No.

R&D expenses

Panel A: Unwinsorized R&D Expenses

Fiscal Year

Table 4.17
R&D Expenses of Firms without the Expenses Equal to Zero

61
Summary of the Results
This chapter presents the results of my empirical analyses on earnings
management around insider offerings. Main findings of the study are as follows:
1. In the year of insider offerings, net income increases while operating cash
flows show no change. In the pre-offer year, offerings firms experience some increases
in both net income and operating cash flows. During the post-offer period, net income
declines significantly.
2. In the offer year, offering firms have negative adjusted discretionary accruals
while they have positive adjusted discretionary accruals during the offer year. The results
suggest that the improving net income in the offer year is a result of upward earnings
management.
3. I find a positive relation between post-offer operating performance and preoffer adjusted discretionary accruals; however, there is no relation between post-offer
stock performance and pre-offer adjusted discretionary accruals. The results suggest that
firms engage in earnings management before insider offerings to smooth earnings.
4. I do not find that offering firms are more likely to be sued than matched firms
during the post-offer period. This finding is consistent with the litigation avoidance
hypothesis that firms engage in earnings management to lower litigation risk.
5. The examination of the occurrence of earnings restatements during the three
years after insider offerings shows that offering firms are not more likely to restate
earnings than matched firms during the three years following the offerings.
6. I find that firms raise R&D investments before insider offerings, in opposition
to the prediction of the managerial opportunism hypothesis.
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Overall, I find no evidence that firms with insider offerings opportunistically
manage earnings upward before the offerings to raise stock prices. Instead, the findings
of downward earnings management before and upward earnings management after
insider offerings are consistent with the earnings smoothing hypothesis and the litigation
avoidance hypothesis.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS
Summary of Prior Research
Prior research suggests that firms have incentives to mislead investors about firm
value around corporate events and documents evidence of opportunistic earnings
management around the events. For example, Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998a and
1998b) find that firms manage earnings upward by increasing discretionary accruals
around the issuance of primary shares. Inflated earnings have a temporary impact on
market valuation and raise the price of issuing firms' securities. In contrast, other studies
suggest that managers do not always use their discretion on financial reporting
opportunistically. That is, firms can manage earnings to achieve smoother earnings or to
lower litigation risks.
Insider offerings provide one setting involving managers' personal wealth and
thus strong incentives for opportunistic earnings management. The literature on earnings
management around insider offerings is limited and provides mixed evidence of earnings
management in that setting. Heron and Lie (2004) find that firms announcing insider
offerings have more positive discretionary accruals than firms announcing other
secondary offerings in the pre-announcement year. In contrast, Marquardt and Wiedman
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(2004) find that firms with insider offerings do not have significantly higher discretionary
accruals than firms with other secondary offerings in the pre-offer year. Despite different
results on pre-event earnings management, the two prior studies show evidence of
positive discretionary accruals around announcements and the completion of the
offerings, respectively.

Positive discretionary accruals around insider offerings

announcements or the completion may be subject to explanations other than managerial
opportunism.
Summary of Current Findings and Conclusions
In this study, I examine earnings management around insider offerings. As firms
have incentives to benefit insider sales, they may opportunistically manage earnings
upward before insider offerings to increase offer prices. On the other hand, as suggested
by Beneish, Press, and Vargus (2005), fear of litigation may motivate firms to manage
earnings downward before and upward after the offerings.

Moreover, I expect that

offering firms engage in earnings smoothing as this is a common practice (e.g., Graham,
Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005)). I test whether offering firms manipulate earnings to
mislead investors to obtain favorable stock prices, to lower litigation risk, or to smooth
earnings. Different from prior studies, I examine two earnings management techniques,
accruals management and real earnings management through R&D expenses. I also
investigate the likelihood of offering firms restating earnings and the likelihood of the
firms being sued during the post-offer period.

This study examines a sample of 490 insider offerings made during 1989 to 2005.
I find that offering firms have negative adjusted discretionary accruals during the preoffer year and positive adjusted discretionary accruals during the offer year. Firms with
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higher discretionary accruals before the offerings show better operating performance
afterwards. In addition, these firms do not have worse stock performance following the
offerings.

Taken together, these results suggest that firms engage in earnings

management before insider offerings to smooth earnings. Moreover, I find no evidence
that offering firms are more likely to be sued or to restate earnings during the three years
after the offerings. Therefore, positive discretionary accruals at the end of the offer year
are not driven by managerial opportunism; instead, upward earnings management after
insider offerings along with the pre-offer earnings management seems to help firms to
lower litigation risk.

In addition, I do not find evidence that firms decrease R&D

expenses before insider offerings to raise offer prices.

Overall, my findings are

consistent with the hypotheses of earnings smoothing and litigation avoidance while
being inconsistent with the managerial opportunism hypothesis.

The finding of

discretionary accruals before insider offerings containing information about the firms'
future operating cash flows suggests that earnings management around the offerings does
not diminish the role of financial statements in capital allocation; rather, it helps improve
the efficiency of capital allocation.
Future Research
One implication of the managerial opportunism hypothesis is that firms with
higher accruals show stock underperformance during the post-offer period as previously
deceived investors reevaluate the firms' securities. In opposition to this prediction, I find

no association between post-offer abnormal returns and pre-offer discretionary accruals.
When assessing the post-offer stock performance, I follow the event-time methodology to
estimated buy-and-hold abnormal returns.

Though the measure of long-term stock
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performance captures real investment strategies, it suffers from cross-sectional
dependence that inflates the statistical significance of the measure (e.g., Mitchell and
Stafford (2000)).

To enhance the reliability of the results on long-term stock

performance, future research could also follow the calendar-time procedure to estimate
post-offer abnormal returns.
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